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Academic careers

Others have already pointed this out, but it’s worth highlighting.

Terence Tao – recent winner of the Field’s medal (a sort of Nobel prize for mathematics) – has written some really interesting career advice. It’s aimed at mathematicians, but lots of it is more generally applicable, and certainly lots of strikes a chord with academic philosophy. It’s also not just for graduates: e.g. I’m a recent-graduate, and I’m sure there’s lots there that I’m not doing, which it’s good to be reminded of.

The advice to “use the wastebasket” is going to be more difficult now that the University of Leeds has decided to remove all wastebackets from our offices…

HT: Shawn Standefer, Richard Zach

p.s. here’s one thing that struck me as particularly transferable:

“Don’t prematurely obsess on a single “big problem” or “big theory”
. This is a particularly dangerous occupational hazard in this subject – that one becomes focused, to the exclusion of other mathematical activity, on a single really difficult problem in a field (or on some grand unifying theory) before one is really ready (both in terms of mathematical preparation, and also in terms of one career) to devote so much of one’s research time to such a project. When one begins to neglect other tasks (such as writing and publishing one’s “lesser” results), hoping to use the eventual “big payoff” of solving a major problem or establishing a revolutionary new theory to make up for lack of progress in all other areas of one’s career, then this is a strong warning sign that one should rebalance one’s priorities. While it is true that several major problems have been solved, and several important theories introduced, by precisely such an obsessive approach, this has only worked out well when the mathematician involved (a) has a proven track record of reliably producing significant papers in the area already, and (b) has a secure career (e.g. a tenured position). If you do not yet have both (a) and (b), and if your ideas on how to solve a big problem still have a significant speculative component (or if your grand theory does not yet have a definite and striking application), I would strongly advocate a more balanced approach instead: keep the big problems and theories in mind, and tinker with them occasionally, but spend most of your time on more feasible “low-hanging fruit”, which will build up your experience, mathematical power, and credibility for when you are ready to tackle the more ambitious projects. “

Pictures from St Andrews (with added commentary)

Courtesy of Brit over at Lemmings

you can find the originals from the link here

We had a great time in St Andrews, by the way. Two good conferences, lots of fun time spent with interesting people. And conference-accommodation to die for…

AJP paper

My paper on a certain kind of argument for structural universals has just appeared in AJP. Very exciting from my perspective: I’ve had things “forthcoming” for so long, I think I thought they’d always have that status.

FWIW, the paper discusses a certain argument for the existence of structural universals (that is, universals “made out of” other universals, as “being water” might be thought to be made out of “being Hydrogen” “being Oxygen” etc.) The argument is based on the (alleged) possibility of worlds with no fundamental physical layer: where things “go down forever”. Quite a few people use this argument in print, and many more raise it in conversation when you’re pressing a microphysicalist metaphysics.

This is part of a wider project exploring a ontological microphysicalism, where the only things that really exist are the physical fundamentals. The recent stuff on ontological commitment is, in part, a continuation of that project.

On a more practical note, I can’t figure out how you access AJP articles these days: my institution is supposed to have a subscription, but the links that take you to the pdf don’t seem live. Any ideas of how to get into it would be gratefully received!

Parsimony and the fundamental (x-posted from metaphysical values)

A bit cross-posting this one…

In his APA comments on Jonathan Schaffer, Ross asks about some of Jonathan’s ideas about the applicability of Ockham’s razor. The question arises if you buy into some robust distinction between “fundamental” and “derivative” existents. Candidate fundamental existents: quarks, electrons, maybe organisms (or maybe just THE WORLD). Candidate derivative existents: weirdo fusions, impure sets, maybe tables and chairs (or maybe everything except THE WORLD).

Let’s call the idea that “derivative” as well as “fundamental” entities are (thump table) existing things the expansivist interpretation of the fundamental/derivative distinction. Call the idea that only the fundamental (thump table) exists the restrictivist interpretation of that distinction.

Jonathan’s position is that Ockham’s razor, rightly understood, tells us to minimize the number of fundamental entities. Ross’s idea (I think?) is that this is right iff one has a restrictivist understanding of the fundamental/derivative distinction. But Jonathan, pretty clearly, has an expansivist understanding of that distinction: he doesn’t want to say that the only thing that (thump table) exists is the world, just that the world is ontologically prior to everything else. So if Ross is right, his application of parsimony is in trouble.

I can see what the idea is here: after all, understanding parsimony as the instruction to minimize (thump table) existents or to minimize the (thump table) kinds of existents is surely close to the traditional understanding. Whereas the idea that we need only minimize (kinds of) existents of such-and-such a type, seems to come a bit out of the blue, and at minimum we need some more explanation before we could accept that revision to our theoretical maxims.

However… One thing that seems important is to consider what sort of principles of parsimony might be present in more ordinary theorizing (e.g. in the special sciences). The appeal of appealing to parsimony in metaphysics is in large part that it’s a general theoretical virtue, applicable in all sorts of areas that are paradigms of good, productive fields of inquiry. Now, theoretical virtues in the sciences is not a topic that I’m in a position to speak with authority on. But one thing that seems to me important in this connection: if you think that the entities of special sciences aren’t fundamental entities, then principles of parsimony restricted to the fundamentals aren’t going to be in a position to give you much bite. (NB: I think that this was raised by someone in comments on Jonathan’s paper in Boise, but I can’t remember who it was…).

If that’s right, then whether you’re an expansivist or a restrictivist about the fundamental/derivative distinction seems beside the point. Any theorist who gives a story about what the fundamentals are that’s unconstrained by what the special sciences say, is going to be in trouble with the idea that principles of parsimony should be restricted to constraints on fundamental existents: for such principles of parsimony won’t then be able to get much bite on theorizing in the special sciences. I’d like to think that quarks, leptons etc are going to populate the fundamental, rather than Jonathan’s WORLD. This point bites me as much as Jonathan.

There’s plenty of room for further discussion here, particularly the interaction of the above with what you take to be evidence for some entities being fundamental. E.g. if you thought that various types of emergentism in special science would be evidence for “higher level” fundamental entities, then maybe the above parsimony principle would still have application to special sciences: it’d tell you to reduce to the number of emergent entities you postulate (i.e. it’d be a methodological imperative towards reductionism).

Also, it seems to me that there is something to the thought that some entities are simply “don’t cares” when applying parsimony principles. If I’m concerned with theorizing about the behaviour of various beetles in front of me, I care about how many kinds of beetles my theory is giving me, but not with how many kinds of mathematical entities I need to invoke in formulating that theory. Now, maybe that differential attitude can be explained away by pointing to the generality of the mathematica involved (e.g. that total science is “already committed to them”). But one natural take would be to look for restrictions to principles of parsimony/Ockham’s razor, making them sensitive to the subject-matter under investigation.

To speculate wildly: If principles of parsimony do need to be sensitized in this way, and if the study of what fundamentally exists is a genuine investigation, maybe the principle of parsimony, in application to that study, really would tell us to minimize the number of, and kinds of, fundamental entities we posit.

APA return

Back in Atlanta waiting to reboard a flight to the UK. Trying not to miss the flight this time (interestingly, the plane from SF was an hour out on the “local time” it displayed on board, which might explain the previous problems).

The APA was really fun. Highlights for me included the Hudson-fest, featuring comments from Josh Parsons, Mark Heller and Michael Rae, and interesting replies to each from Hud. Also the author-meets-critics session on dialethism which Brit mentions here. I’ve been thinking a lot about open futures following Brit’s talk on sea battle semantics, and may have some thoughts to post soon (on the plane over to Atlanta, my frantic drawing of dots and arrows trying to figure out how counterfactuals interact with open future semantics convinced my neighbour I was an astrophysicist. Must be the big axes with “time” and “reality” on them…). Andy Egan gave two really interesting papers, on fragmented minds and aesthetic disagreement, and I really enjoyed Alyssa Ney‘s talk on how different theories of causation fit together (or not). And lots more nice people met and good stuff talked about!

It was fun also meeting various bloggers for the first time in the flesh.

The tale of the 14 philosophers and the limousine is already legendary, I gather (I wasn’t there).

San Francisco

San Francisco! I’m staying at a hotel with a very posh lobby, the Sir Francis Drake, just down the street from the APA venue. I’ve enjoyed a hour-long double-decker train journey, and am just being struck once more about the strangeness of being in a different country.

I think food may be in order, then recovery before the hard philosophical slog restarts…

To the APA

The Boise metametaphysics conference finished today. A really fun event! I gave quick versions of my comments on Ted’s naturalness paper this morning.

One thing that was kind of surprising to me is that there weren’t many people defending the sort of “realist Quinean” view that I (along with a lot of people) took to be the orthodoxy. Carnapians (of various flavours), Aristotelians, and the like were more in evidence.

I found the framework and ideas in Dave Chalmers’ “Ontological anti-realism” paper particularly stimulating. It suggests to me some nice ways of extending some of the views I have on ontic vagueness. Lots to think about.

Anyway, I’m now about to get on a plane for San Francisco, for the Pacific APA. It was very exciting seeing the Pacific for the first time as I flew in to SF on the way to Boise; I’m really looking forward to seeing the city and attending the conference.

West coast journeying

I’m currently in Atlanta airport.

I didn’t mean to be still here. A combination of tiredness, lack of care with a watch, and (I suspect) there being different timezones in different terminals, mean that I missed my connecting flight.

On the positive side, I was happily making notes on excellent metametaphysics papers while missing my flight. Still, an all-things-considered bad, I think.

But the nice people at Delta rebooked me, and (modulo a taxi journey and quite possibly sleeping at San Jose airport) my travel plans are back in the swing.

So long as I don’t miss another flight through blogging…

Naturalness in Idaho (x-post from MV)

I’m off very soon to the INPC metametaphysics conference in Boise. Many other fun people will be there (not least fellow CMM-er Andy McGonigal, fresh from a spell at Cornell).

Together with Iris Einheuser, I’m going to be responding to Ted Sider’s paper “Which disputes are substantive?”. It’s been great to have a serious think about the way that Ted thinks of this stuff, and how it relates to the Kit Fine inspired setting that I’ve been working on lately.

Anyway, the whole writing-a-response thing got way out of hand, and I’ve ended up with a 7,500 word first draft. I do think there’s a couple of substantive issues raised therein for the kind of framework (otherwise really really attractive) that he’s been pushing here and in recent work. The worry centres around quantification into the scope of Ted’s “naturalness” operator. For any who are interested, I’ve put the draft response up online.

After the INPC, I’ll be in San Fran for the Pacific APA, along with many other CMM and Leeds folks.

Back!

Things have been very slow on the blogging front recently: a product of hecticity in all aspects of life over the last few weeks. Apologies in particular to those who have left comments

On the research side, I was down in Oxford on Friday giving a talk to the departmental Philosophical Society on “Semantics for nihilists”. This is a paper that’s turning into a more general project of showing how to get truths about macro-objects, or sets, say, without having to having to admit macro-objects into ones ontology. As I think of these things, the real issue here concerns the nature of ontological commitment (Agustin Rayo‘s recent papers convinced me of this). I’m planning to write up this stuff at the next available opportunity. I’m giving it again at a “Structure in Metaphysics” workshop here in Leeds, soon.

I’m also in the process of organizing my trip to Boise, Idaho, for the metametaphysics conference there.

Finally, on the news front: I’m going to be on research leave next year, courtesy of those nice people of the AHRC. It’s for a project called “Intrinsic survival, multiple survival, vague survival”, which takes on a cluster of issues, including intrinsicality, ontic vagueness, fission cases, and the problem of the many. One part of the application was to give regular research updates on this blog, so I’m committed to keep this active while on leave!